¡A LOS GUERREROS ENCUBIERTOS NO SE LES ADJUDICA RESPONSABILIDAD POR SUS ACTOS!
COVERT WARRIORS ARE NOT ACCOUNTABLE!
Esta película es maravillosa porque:
This movie is wonderful because:
1) Promueve las operaciones encubiertas estadounidenses.
INTELLIGENCE AND ETHICS: THE CIA'S COVERT OPERATIONS. By DAVID CANON (Department of Political Science, Indiana University.)
THE RISE OF THE SHADOW WARRIORS. By JENNIFER D. KIBBE.
2) Ha recibido ayuda del DEPARTAMENTO DE DEFENSA ESTADOUNIDENSE (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE).
3) Forma parte de las operaciones psicológicas (desarrolladas en los cien años recientes) dirigidas a generar creencias en la existencia de los OVNIS [OBJETOS VOLADORES NO IDENTIFICADOS] (UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS / UFOs).
4) Los modelos sociales que presenta son ideológicos.
5) Presenta un homenaje oculto al gran cineasta peruano DON LEÓNIDAS ZEGARRA UCEDA.
Por este motivo, otorgamos a "LOS VENGADORES" (THE AVENGERS) una posición destacada entre los MEJORES ESTRENOS 2012 (BEST MOVIES 2012 IN PERU).
En respuesta a unas cuantas decenas de miles de peticiones de nuestros lectores presentamos a los personajes de esta fotografía. A la derecha derecha de la imagen vemos a Don HUGO BLANCO GALDÓS, Ex-Diputado de la República del Perú y periodista exitoso que dirige el periódico "LUCHA INDÍGENA" (http://www.luchaindigena.com/). Sus cualidades como director de un medio de comunicación son notables y podemos compararlo en eficiencia con Don ALDO MARIÁTEGUI BOSSE, director del diario "CORREO" (de Lima) (http://diariocorreo.pe/). Entre el trabajo de Don ALDO y Don HUGO existe un parecido notable en cuanto a metodología y entusiasmo y si se reconoce una diferencia, meramente es de signo (político) [como el + y el −] o de polaridad [como el polo positivo y el polo negativo]. La dialéctica nos permite comprender que ambos son manifestaciones características de un mismo fenómeno social. Se dice que el pensamiento político de Don HUGO BLANCO GALDÓS recibió la influencia de LEÓN TROTSKY quien, como afirma LEWIS JACOBS, trabajó en la industria del cine estadounidense [puede verse foto del texto de JACOBS en nuestro comentario a "SE BUSCA" /"WANTED"], por lo cual deducimos que estamos ante otro admirador más de las maravillosas películas que se producen en los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica. Cuenta la leyenda que, cuando Don HUGO BLANCO GALDÓS fue condenado a muerte [no imaginamos la razón, ¿tal vez cruzó una luz roja?] durante el primer gobierno del arquitecto FERNANDO BELAUNDE TERRY, entre quienes firmaron una petición para que se respete su vida se encontraban la actriz inglesa VANESSA REDGRAVE (fundadora del PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DE LOS TRABAJADORES en el Reino Unido) y la actriz estadounidense JANE FONDA. ¡Don HUGO definitivamente mantiene una apasionada relación de vida-o-muerte con el séptimo arte!. A la izquierda, en la imagen, se encuentra el magíster JORGE VILLACORTA SANTAMATO, director de perucine.blogspot.com, actor en el filme "MARÍA Y LOS NIÑOS POBRES" del cineasta anti-marxista Don LEÓNIDAS ZEGARRA UCEDA, productor de largometrajes [actualmente tiene varios proyectos en diferentes estados de desarrollo] y Secretario General Emperador del Partido Marxista-Leninista-Pensamiento Paris Hilton. Al emprender la búsqueda de unos bailarines de conga para incluir un segmento musical en una de las producciones que prepara, llegó hasta la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos y se encontró con una charla sobre un proyecto minero. Como todo es para algo bueno, aprovechó para fotografiarse con uno de los disertantes. Después de todo, fuentes poco conocedoras de la política peruana afirman que Don HUGO BLANCO GALDÓS podría ser el próximo Presidente del Perú o lanzarse como parte de la lista de Don PEDRO PABLO KUCZYNSKI. Otros ignorantes afirman que se le quiere dar un cargo político para aislarlo de las masas. En cualquier caso, Don HUGO mantiene la propuesta leninista que afirma que el poder debe ir a los soviets o, traducido, que las organizaciones populares deben administrar la vida social directamente, de modo comunal. Mientras tanto, en perucine.blogspot.com nos preparamos para celebrar la llegada al Perú de la filósofa PARIS HILTON, probablemente en Octubre o Noviembre de 2012. Su magnun opus es, con toda seguridad, "CONFESIONES DE UNA HEREDERA" / "CONFESSIONS OF AN HEIRESS. A TONGUE-IN-CHICK PEEK BEHIND THE POSE" (escrito con la colaboración de MERLE GINSBERG) texto cuya portada puede apreciarse a nuestro comentario a la película peruana más importante del siglo XX: "DE NUEVO A LA VIDA".
Título: "COMUNICACIÓN SOCIAL Y MISTICISMO: PARA ATRAPAR AL MARCIANO". Autor: MARCOS WINOCUR. Editor: Editorial Cartago de México S.A., México, 1982, 83 páginas.
[Página 83:]
"ÍNDICE
INTRODUCCIÓN ... 5
I. TODO LO CONCEBIBLE ES POSIBLE Y TODO LO POSIBLE ES REAL ... 9
II. ENTRE SIGLOS Y ENTRE VERNE Y WELLS ... 15
III. ¿EL PLANETA SOBRE RUEDAS O EL UNIVERSO SOBRE RUEDAS? ... 23
IV. EXAMEN DE FUENTES PROPORCIONADAS POR LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN MASIVA ... 29
Localización geográfica y clasificación ... 31
a. Ciencia Ficción y clasificación ... 31
aa. Literatura y cine ... 33
ab. Serie televisión ... 37
ac. Noticia ... 42
b. Ciencia ficción en otras áreas ... 46
ba. Como injerto ... 47
bb. Como intrusa ... 48
bba. Medicina: la muerte ... 48
bbb. Historia: los cosmodioses ... 57
bbc: Otros y otros ... 64
bc. Como cohabitante ... 67
CONCLUSIONES ... 71
NOTAS ... 79"
CIA:THE PIKE REPORT (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: EL INFORME PIKE). Published by SPOKESMAN BOOKS for the BERTRAND RUSSELL PEACE FOUNDATION, Bertrand Russell House, Gamble Street, Nottingham. Printed by the Russell Press Ltd., 45 Gamble Street, Nottingham NG7 4ET. Tel: (0602)74505. 284 pages, 1977.
The publishers acknowledge their gratitude to the New York Village Voice, which first published Parts I and II of the Pike Repor in newspaper format in February 1976.
CONTENTS
Introduction by Philip Agee ... 7
Section One:
The Select Committee's Oversight Experience ... 25
Access to Information ... 26
Footnotes ... 27
1. Delay ... 32
Footnotes ... 33
2. Cut-off ... 36
Footnotes ... 39
3. Silenced Witnesses ... 45
Footnotes ... 46
4. Flank Attack ... 50
a. An Attack Averted ... 50
Footnotes ... 52
5. Deletions ... 55
Footnotes ... 58
6. Privileges ... 62
Footnotes ... 63
7. More Delay ... 65
Footnotes ... 67
8. Routine Problems ... 69
a.The Right Question ... 71
Footnotes ... 73
Congress and the Secrecy Dilemma ... 76
Footnotes ... 77
1. Oaths and Agreements ... 78
Footnotes ... 80
2. Selective Briefings ... 84
Footnotes ... 85
3. Special Restrictions ... 88
Footnotes ... 89
4. The Release of Information ... 90
Footnotes ... 93
Section Two:
The Select Committee's Investigative Record ... 96
Costs ... 96
1. Deceptive Budgets ... 98
Footnotes ... 102
2. An Absence of Accountability ... 107
3. Spending Abuses ... 109
a. Covert Procurement ... 109
b. Local Procurement ... 111
c. Accomodation Procurements ... 112
d. Research and Development ... 115
e. Colleges and Universities ... 117
f. U.S. Recording ... 118
Footnotes ... 120
4. Budget Secrecy ... 126
Footnotes ... 127
Performance ... 129
1. Tet: Failure to Adapt to a New Kind of War ... 130
a. The Order of Battle Controversy ... 131
b. The Consequences ... 133
c. The Aftermath ... 135
Footnotes ... 136
2. Czechoslovakia: Failure Of Tactical Warning ... 139
3. The Mid-East War: The System Breaks Down ... 141
Footnotes ... 146
4. Portugal: The U.S. Caught Napping ... 149
Footnotes ... 153
5. India: Priorities Lost ... 153
6. Cyprus: Failure of Intelligence Policy ... 158
Footnotes ... 163
7. Domestic Internal Security and Counterintelligence ... 168
a. Institute for Policy Studies ... 168
b. Socialist Workers Party ... 171
Footnotes ... 173
8. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board ... 174
Footnotes ... 175
9. National Security Council Intelligence Committee ... 177
10. The Management and Production of Defense Intelligence ... 179
Footnotes ... 182
Risks ... 185
1. Covert Action ... 186
a. Ten Year Survey ... 187
b. Election Support ... 190
c. Media and Propaganda ... 190
d. Paramilitary / Arms Tranfers ... 191
e. Organizational Support ... 191
f. Trends ... 192
g. Three Projects ... 192
Case 1: Election Support ... 193
Case 2: Arms Support ... 195
Case 3: Angola ... 198
Footnotes ... 202
2. Intelligence Collection ... 219
a.
b.
c. Manipulation of the Media ... 222
d.
e.
Footnotes ... 230
3. Domestic Intelligence Investigations ... 237
a.
The Houston Episode ... 244
Footnotes ... 244
4. SALT - Political Control of Intelligence ... 249
Footnotes ... 251
Section Three:
Committee Recommendations ... 257
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
O.
P.
Q.
R.
S.
T.
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. LES ASPIN ... 263
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS ... 264
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. WILLIAM LEHMAN ... 267
THE FBI ... 268
THE IRS ... 268
RECOMMENDATIONS ... 268
SUMMARY ... 268
RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. DALE MILFORD ... 269
A.
B.
C.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. MORGAN F. MURPHY ... 270
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. JAMES V. STANTON ... 270
ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. ROBERT McCLORY ... 271
ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. ROBERT McCORY ... 271
B.
C.
D.
E.
F. DETAILESS ... 273
Page 190:
"c. Media and Propaganda
Some 29 percent of Forty Committee-approved covert actions were for media and propaganda projects. This number is probably not representative. Staff has determined the existence of a large number of CIA internally-approved operations of this type, apparently deemed not politically sensitive. It is believed that if the correct number of all media and propaganda projects could be determined, it would exceed Election Support as the largest single category of covert action projects undertaken by the CIA.
Activities have included support of friendly media, major propaganda efforts, insertion of articles into the local press, and distribution of books and leaflets. By far the largest single recipient has been a European publishing house funded since 1951. There are a number of similar operations in the region. About 25 percent of the program has been directed at the Soviet Bloc, in the publication and clandestine import and export of Western and Soviet dissident literature."
Pages 222-224:
"c. Manipulation of the Media
The free flow of information, vital to a responsible and credible press, has been threatened as a result of CIA's use of the world media for cover and clandestine information-gathering.
There are disturbing indications that the accuracy of many news stories has been undermined as well. Information supplied for the Committee suggests that some planted, falsified articles have reached readers in the U.S. [495]
Intelligence agencies have long prized journalists as informants and identity-covers. Newsmen generally enjoy great mobility, and are often admitted to areas denied to ordinary businessmen or to suspected intelligence types. Not expected to work in one fixed location, both bona fide journalists and masquerading intelligence officers can move about without arousing suspicions. They can have extraordinary access to important foreign leaders and diplomats.
CIA; as no doubt every other major intelligence agency in the world, has manipulated the media. Full-time foreign correspondents for major U.S. publications have worked concurrently for CIA, passing along information received in the normal course of their regular jobs and even, on ocassion, travelling to otherwise non-newsworthy areas to acquire data. Far more prevalent is the Agency's practice of retaining free-lancers and "stringers" as informants. A stringer working in a less-newsworthy country could supply stories to a newspaper, radio, and a weekly magazine, none of whom can justify a full-time correspondent. This may make the use of stringers even more insidious than exploitation of full-time journalists.
The Committee has learned that the employment of newsmen by CIA is usually without the knowledge or agreement of the employers back in the U.S. Publishers have been unable, despise strenuous effort, to learn from the Agency which, if any, of their employees have had a clandestine intelligence function. [498] Newsmen-informants apparently do not often disclose this relationship to their editors. The Committee has learned of cases in which informants moved from one bona fide press position to another, without ever making employers aware of their past or present CIA status.
CIA acknowledges that "stringers" and others with whom the Agency has a relationship are often directed to insert Agency-composed "news" articles into foreign publications and wire services. U.S. intelligence officials do not rule out the possibility that these planted stories may find their way into American newspapers from time to time, but insist that CIA does not intentionally propagandize in this country. CIA insensitivity to the possibility of its adultering news digested by Americans is indicated by its frequent manipulation of Reuters wire service dispatches - which regularly appear in U.S. media. Because Reuters is British, it is considered fair game. [499]
A number of CIA officers employed by U.S. and foreign publications write nothing at all. Their journalistic affiliation is a "cover" - a sham arrangement making possible full-time clandestine work for the Agency. With these arrangements, the employer´s cooperation has been obtained. [500]
After the Washington Star-News discovered a CIA-media relationship in 1973, Director Colby ordered a review of these practices. Subsequently, the Agency terminated the informant relationship of five full-time employees of American periodicals. Stringers and free-lancers are still on the payroll, despite their periodic reporting for a U.S. media usually unaware of the writer's CIA connection. [501]
The use of American press enterprises as a cover has been tightened somewhat. No longer, for example, can a CIA officer in the field arrange for cover without headquarters approval.
Director Colby, citing the Agency's continuing need for reliable information and the increasing reluctance of private firms and the government to provide cover, has maintained that the recent reforms have reduced risks to an acceptable level."
The publishers acknowledge their gratitude to the New York Village Voice, which first published Parts I and II of the Pike Repor in newspaper format in February 1976.
CONTENTS
Introduction by Philip Agee ... 7
Section One:
The Select Committee's Oversight Experience ... 25
Access to Information ... 26
Footnotes ... 27
1. Delay ... 32
Footnotes ... 33
2. Cut-off ... 36
Footnotes ... 39
3. Silenced Witnesses ... 45
Footnotes ... 46
4. Flank Attack ... 50
a. An Attack Averted ... 50
Footnotes ... 52
5. Deletions ... 55
Footnotes ... 58
6. Privileges ... 62
Footnotes ... 63
7. More Delay ... 65
Footnotes ... 67
8. Routine Problems ... 69
a.The Right Question ... 71
Footnotes ... 73
Congress and the Secrecy Dilemma ... 76
Footnotes ... 77
1. Oaths and Agreements ... 78
Footnotes ... 80
2. Selective Briefings ... 84
Footnotes ... 85
3. Special Restrictions ... 88
Footnotes ... 89
4. The Release of Information ... 90
Footnotes ... 93
Section Two:
The Select Committee's Investigative Record ... 96
Costs ... 96
1. Deceptive Budgets ... 98
Footnotes ... 102
2. An Absence of Accountability ... 107
3. Spending Abuses ... 109
a. Covert Procurement ... 109
b. Local Procurement ... 111
c. Accomodation Procurements ... 112
d. Research and Development ... 115
e. Colleges and Universities ... 117
f. U.S. Recording ... 118
Footnotes ... 120
4. Budget Secrecy ... 126
Footnotes ... 127
Performance ... 129
1. Tet: Failure to Adapt to a New Kind of War ... 130
a. The Order of Battle Controversy ... 131
b. The Consequences ... 133
c. The Aftermath ... 135
Footnotes ... 136
2. Czechoslovakia: Failure Of Tactical Warning ... 139
3. The Mid-East War: The System Breaks Down ... 141
Footnotes ... 146
4. Portugal: The U.S. Caught Napping ... 149
Footnotes ... 153
5. India: Priorities Lost ... 153
6. Cyprus: Failure of Intelligence Policy ... 158
Footnotes ... 163
7. Domestic Internal Security and Counterintelligence ... 168
a. Institute for Policy Studies ... 168
b. Socialist Workers Party ... 171
Footnotes ... 173
8. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board ... 174
Footnotes ... 175
9. National Security Council Intelligence Committee ... 177
10. The Management and Production of Defense Intelligence ... 179
Footnotes ... 182
Risks ... 185
1. Covert Action ... 186
a. Ten Year Survey ... 187
b. Election Support ... 190
c. Media and Propaganda ... 190
d. Paramilitary / Arms Tranfers ... 191
e. Organizational Support ... 191
f. Trends ... 192
g. Three Projects ... 192
Case 1: Election Support ... 193
Case 2: Arms Support ... 195
Case 3: Angola ... 198
Footnotes ... 202
2. Intelligence Collection ... 219
a.
b.
c. Manipulation of the Media ... 222
d.
e.
Footnotes ... 230
3. Domestic Intelligence Investigations ... 237
a.
The Houston Episode ... 244
Footnotes ... 244
4. SALT - Political Control of Intelligence ... 249
Footnotes ... 251
Section Three:
Committee Recommendations ... 257
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
O.
P.
Q.
R.
S.
T.
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. LES ASPIN ... 263
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS ... 264
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. WILLIAM LEHMAN ... 267
THE FBI ... 268
THE IRS ... 268
RECOMMENDATIONS ... 268
SUMMARY ... 268
RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. DALE MILFORD ... 269
A.
B.
C.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. MORGAN F. MURPHY ... 270
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. JAMES V. STANTON ... 270
ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. ROBERT McCLORY ... 271
ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. ROBERT McCORY ... 271
B.
C.
D.
E.
F. DETAILESS ... 273
Page 190:
"c. Media and Propaganda
Some 29 percent of Forty Committee-approved covert actions were for media and propaganda projects. This number is probably not representative. Staff has determined the existence of a large number of CIA internally-approved operations of this type, apparently deemed not politically sensitive. It is believed that if the correct number of all media and propaganda projects could be determined, it would exceed Election Support as the largest single category of covert action projects undertaken by the CIA.
Activities have included support of friendly media, major propaganda efforts, insertion of articles into the local press, and distribution of books and leaflets. By far the largest single recipient has been a European publishing house funded since 1951. There are a number of similar operations in the region. About 25 percent of the program has been directed at the Soviet Bloc, in the publication and clandestine import and export of Western and Soviet dissident literature."
Pages 222-224:
"c. Manipulation of the Media
The free flow of information, vital to a responsible and credible press, has been threatened as a result of CIA's use of the world media for cover and clandestine information-gathering.
There are disturbing indications that the accuracy of many news stories has been undermined as well. Information supplied for the Committee suggests that some planted, falsified articles have reached readers in the U.S. [495]
Intelligence agencies have long prized journalists as informants and identity-covers. Newsmen generally enjoy great mobility, and are often admitted to areas denied to ordinary businessmen or to suspected intelligence types. Not expected to work in one fixed location, both bona fide journalists and masquerading intelligence officers can move about without arousing suspicions. They can have extraordinary access to important foreign leaders and diplomats.
CIA; as no doubt every other major intelligence agency in the world, has manipulated the media. Full-time foreign correspondents for major U.S. publications have worked concurrently for CIA, passing along information received in the normal course of their regular jobs and even, on ocassion, travelling to otherwise non-newsworthy areas to acquire data. Far more prevalent is the Agency's practice of retaining free-lancers and "stringers" as informants. A stringer working in a less-newsworthy country could supply stories to a newspaper, radio, and a weekly magazine, none of whom can justify a full-time correspondent. This may make the use of stringers even more insidious than exploitation of full-time journalists.
The Committee has learned that the employment of newsmen by CIA is usually without the knowledge or agreement of the employers back in the U.S. Publishers have been unable, despise strenuous effort, to learn from the Agency which, if any, of their employees have had a clandestine intelligence function. [498] Newsmen-informants apparently do not often disclose this relationship to their editors. The Committee has learned of cases in which informants moved from one bona fide press position to another, without ever making employers aware of their past or present CIA status.
CIA acknowledges that "stringers" and others with whom the Agency has a relationship are often directed to insert Agency-composed "news" articles into foreign publications and wire services. U.S. intelligence officials do not rule out the possibility that these planted stories may find their way into American newspapers from time to time, but insist that CIA does not intentionally propagandize in this country. CIA insensitivity to the possibility of its adultering news digested by Americans is indicated by its frequent manipulation of Reuters wire service dispatches - which regularly appear in U.S. media. Because Reuters is British, it is considered fair game. [499]
A number of CIA officers employed by U.S. and foreign publications write nothing at all. Their journalistic affiliation is a "cover" - a sham arrangement making possible full-time clandestine work for the Agency. With these arrangements, the employer´s cooperation has been obtained. [500]
After the Washington Star-News discovered a CIA-media relationship in 1973, Director Colby ordered a review of these practices. Subsequently, the Agency terminated the informant relationship of five full-time employees of American periodicals. Stringers and free-lancers are still on the payroll, despite their periodic reporting for a U.S. media usually unaware of the writer's CIA connection. [501]
The use of American press enterprises as a cover has been tightened somewhat. No longer, for example, can a CIA officer in the field arrange for cover without headquarters approval.
Director Colby, citing the Agency's continuing need for reliable information and the increasing reluctance of private firms and the government to provide cover, has maintained that the recent reforms have reduced risks to an acceptable level."
http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1976/eirv03n07-19760215/eirv03n07-19760215_019-pike_committee_report_leaked_to.pdf
http://brainmind.com/AmericaBetrayedAssassins.pdf
http://brainmind.com/AmericaBetrayedAssassins.pdf
http://leonidaszegarra.blogspot.com/2012/02/la-virgen-de-copacabana-en-ejutv.html
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