jueves, 21 de junio de 2012



High-level access granted to filmmakers researching a movie about the Osama bin Laden raid is just the latest episode in an increasingly close, cooperative arrangement that has spanned administrations.
May 26, 2012|By Ken Dilanian and Rebecca Keegan

WASHINGTON — Some Republican lawmakers were outraged when federal records released last week showed that the White House, CIA and Defense Department granted high-level access last year to a pair of acclaimed filmmakers researching an action thriller about the raid that killed Osama bin Laden.
The documents tell "a damning story of extremely close, unprecedented, and potentially dangerous collaboration" between the filmmakers and the Obama administration, fumed New York Rep. Peter T. King, GOP chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee.
The Defense Department's inspector general is investigating whether any classified information was improperly disclosed. But barring that, the episode is just the latest in an increasingly close, cooperative arrangement — spanning administrations — that gives Hollywood extraordinary access to military assets and CIA operatives. In turn, the Pentagon and CIA have exercised subtle and not-so-subtle influence on scripts and helped burnish their images on screen.
Peter Berg, who directed the recently released science fiction film"Battleship," was allowed to use five Navy warships during production, and cast Navy Secretary Ray Mabus in a cameo role. Mabus later helped launch the film at a Washington screening for Navy brass and service members.
The Navy weighed in twice for changes, Berg said.
"At one point, we hired an actor who was a little overweight to play a sailor," he recalled. "They said, 'This kid could not be on a ship,' and we changed the casting." In another scene, a sailor got into a fistfight. "It was important to them that he be held accountable."
Berg clearly has good relations with the Navy. He embedded for a month with Navy SEALs in western Iraq as research for an upcoming military film, "Lone Survivor." Few journalists have gotten that access.
Filmmaker Lionel Chetwynd was granted an hour with President George W. Bush for Showtime Networks' "DC 9/11: Time of Crisis," a patriotic 2003 docudrama about the White House response to the Sept. 11 attacks.
The latest flap concerns more than 250 pages of CIA and Pentagon emails and other records showing how national security officials cooperated with Hollywood director Kathryn Bigelow and screenwriter Mark Boal for an election-year spy thriller expected to portray President Obama in a positive light.
Nothing in the documents — obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Judicial Watch, which describes itself as a conservative organization — indicates that the filmmakers were given classified material.
But David Robb, author of "Operation Hollywood: How the Pentagon Shapes and Censors the Movies," sees other dangers.

OPERATION HOLLYWOOD. May 16, 2004. 1 hour.
Center For Inquiry - West.

"When the CIA or the Pentagon says, 'We'll help you, if you play ball with us,' that's favoring one form of speech over another. It becomes propaganda," he said. "The danger for filmmakers is that their product — entertainment and information — ends up being government spin."
The military's symbiotic relationship with movies dates to the 1920s; the Pentagon regularly traded warships, bombers and technical expertise over the decades for a chance to glamorize the military and boost recruitment.
The CIA has kept an entertainment liaison on staff only since 1996. At that point, the Cold War had ended, and the agency was fighting for its budget and its existence on Capitol Hill. The new mission was clear: to overcome the CIA's image in popular entertainment as incompetent, evil or rife with rogue employees.
"I made that a big priority, and we did a lot more with Hollywood than ever before," said Bill Harlow, the CIA public affairs chief from 1997 to 2004. "The reason is that the American public gets a lot more of their information about the CIA from Hollywood than it does the from the news media, and much of what they see about the agency is negative and wrong."



These days, the CIA even posts potential story lines on its website, according to spokesman Todd Ebitz.
"On some occasions, when appropriate, we arrange visits to the agency for unclassified meetings with some of our officers," he added. "Rarely, we have allowed filming on our premises under very tight parameters."
In 1999, the CIA allowed producers of "In the Company of Spies" to film at CIA headquarters, a first for the agency. About 50 CIA employees joined the cast as extras, and hundreds packed a premiere at the headquarters.
In 2001, the agency allowed crews from "The Agency," a CBS television drama, to film inside CIA headquarters. The CIA planned a red-carpet reception before the show first aired, but the party was canceled after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
"These are smart people," said Michael Frost Beckner, who wrote and produced "The Agency." "They have their agenda in mind, and if you're serving their agenda, they play ball with you."
One episode in the series, which aired for two seasons, featured the CIA firing a Hellfire missile from a Predator drone at a terrorist in Pakistan, a relative rarity at the time. A few weeks later, Beckner recalled, a CIA drone strike occurred and made headlines.
"The Hellfire missile thing, they suggested that," Beckner said. "I didn't come up with this stuff. I think they were doing a public opinion poll by virtue of giving me some good ideas."
In 2003, producers of "The Recruit" also worked closely with the CIA. The agency wasn't pleased that the film showed a CIA trainee being beaten in a mock interrogation, but the DVD extras included a CIA officer explaining that the scene was fiction. And star Al Pacino plugs a cherished agency myth in the movie, saying the CIA's failures are well-known but its successes are secret.
"The CIA has been subtly influencing motion picture content for more than 15 years," said Tricia Jenkins, author of "The CIA in Hollywood," the first academic appraisal of the CIA's efforts to influence popular entertainment.

Jenkins said the CIA's cultivation of Hollywood paid off after the Sept. 11 attacks.
"Even as the CIA was subject to incredible public criticism for failing to predict the attacks, there came a spate of TV shows and movies depicting the CIA as competent, effective and willing to share intelligence," she said.
The bloom has worn off somewhat. In this year's "Safe House,"starring Denzel Washington, a senior CIA officer is willing to kill his own employees to keep secret a file detailing misdeeds of the CIA and other intelligence agencies.
Such negative depictions help explain why senior spies and intelligence professionals were eager to highlight their role in helping Navy SEALs finally find and kill Bin Laden at his hide-out in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011.
To that end, Bigelow and Boal were granted significant cooperation by CIA officials and the Pentagon's intelligence chief. A few years earlier, the Defense Department did not provide production assistance for Bigelow and Boal's Iraq war movie,"The Hurt Locker," which won the 2009 Academy Award for best picture.
This time, the pair were offered an interview with a Navy SEAL, the newly released documents show. The SEAL was not involved in planning the raid and the meeting never occurred, according to Lt. Col James Gregory, a Pentagon spokesman.
The pair also were taken into a room at CIA headquarters called "the vault," where tactical planning for the Bin Laden raid had taken place. A CIA spokesman said that the term is agency jargon for any secure room, and that it was empty the day they visited.
The documents also show how the filmmakers are seeking to construct a tense narrative of the decade-long hunt that finally led toBin Laden's death.
"Part of the challenge for us is to capture how difficult this was because there is a version of it that in hindsight, it just looks like it fell into place," Boal told Defense officials at a meeting July 14, according to a transcript. "That is why I just wanted to ask you hypothetically about what could have happened wrong, because it makes it more dramatic when it all goes right."
For his part, Adm. William McRaven, head of Special Operations Command, which includes the SEALs, brushed off all the fuss. At a news conference Thursday in Tampa, Fla., he downplayed the Bin Laden raid as anything special.
"There was nothing overly sensitive about this raid," he said. "From a military standpoint, this was a standard raid and really not very sexy."
Keegan reported from Los Angeles. David S. Cloud in the Washington bureau contributed to this report.


miércoles, 20 de junio de 2012



Esta película es maravillosa porque:
This movie is wonderful because:

1) Muestra cómo las agencias de espionaje estadounidenses se administran según intereses privados.


3) Realiza algunas bromas a costa de las operaciones psicológicas desarrolladas en los años recientes.

- referencia a la granja de alpacas.
- referencia a la lana de alpaca.
- guiño frente al letrero de precio que indica 11 dólares con 95 centavos ($ 11.95). 
- ojo gigante en el baño de damas como decorado de fondo.

4) Presenta un homenaje oculto al gran cineasta peruano DON LEÓNIDAS ZEGARRA UCEDA.

Por este motivo, otorgamos a "ESTO ES LA GUERRA" (THIS MEANS WAR) una posición destacada entre los MEJORES ESTRENOS 2012 (BEST MOVIES 2012 IN PERU).


Páginas 62-65:

"Camp Peary, Virginia - April 1960
Psychological and paramilitary, known as PP or KUCAGE, operations differ from those of FI or CI because they are action rather than collection activities. Collection operations should be invisible so that the target will be unaware of them. Action operations, on the other hand, always produce a visible effect. This, however, should never be attributable to the CIA or to the U.S. government, but rather to some other person or organization. These operations, which received their Congressional charter in the National Security Act of 1947 under "additional services of common concern," are in some ways more sensitive than collection operations. They are usually approved by the PP staff of the DDP, but when very large amounts of money are required or especially sensitive methods are used approval may be required of the OCB (Under-Secretary level), the NSC or the President himself.
PP operations are, of course, risky because they nearly always mean intervention in the affairs of another country with whom the U.S. enjoys normal diplomatic missions. If their true sponsorship were found out the diplomatic consequences could be serious. This is in contrast to collection operations, for if these are discovered foreign politicians are often prepared to turn a blind eye - they are a traditional part of every nation's intelligence activity.
Thus the cardinal rule to planning all PP operations is "plausible denial," only possible if care has been taken in the first place to ensure that someone other than the U.S. government can be made to take the blame. 
PP programs arte to be found in almost every CIA station and emphasis on the kinds of PP operations will depend very much on local conditions. Psychological warfare includes propaganda (also known simply as "media"), work in youth and student organizations, work in labor organizations (trade unions, etc.), work in professional and cultural groups and in political parties. Paramilitary operations include infiltration into denied areas, sabotage, economic warfare, personal harassment, air and maritime support, weaponry, training adn support for small armies.

Media Operations

The CIA's role in the U.S. propaganda program is determined by the official division of propaganda into three general categories: white, grey and black. White propaganda is that which is openly acknowledged as coming from the U.S. government, e.g. from the U.S. Information Agency (USIA); grey propaganda i ostensibly attributed to people or organizations who do not acknowledge the U.S. government as the source of their material and who produce the material as if it were their own; black propaganda is unatributed material, or it is attributed to a non-existent source, or it is false material attributed to a real source. The CIA is the only U.S. government authorized to engage in black propaganda operations, but it shares the responsibility for grey propaganda with other agencies such as USIA. However, according to the "Grey Law" of the National Security Council contained in one of the NSCID's, other agencies must obtain prior CIA approval before engaging in grey propaganda.
The vehicles for grey and black propaganda may be unaware of their CIA or U.S. government sponsorship. This is partly so that it can be more effective  and partly to keep down the number of people who know what is going on and thus to reduce the danger of exposing true sponsorship. Thus editorialists, politicians, businessmen and others may produce propaganda, even for money without necessarily knowing who their masters in the case are. Some among them obviously will and so, in agency terminology, there is a distinction between "witting" and "unwitting agents.
In propaganda operations, as in all other PP activities, standar agency security procedure forbids payment for services rendered to be made by a CIA officer working under official cover (one posing as an official of the Department of State, for instance). This is in order to maintain "plausible denial" and to minimize the danger of embarrasment to the local embassy if anything is discovered by the local government. However, payment is made by CIA officers under non-official cover, e.g. posing as businessmen, students or as retired people; such officers are said to be working under non-official cover.
Officers working under non-official cover may also handle most of the contacts with the recruited agents in order to keep the officer under official cover as protected as possible. Equally, meetings between the two kinds of officer will be as secret as may be.  The object of all this is to protect the embassy and sometimes to make the propaganda agents believe that they are being paid by private businesses.
Headquaters's propaganda experts have visited us in ISOLATION and have displayed the mass of paper they issue as material for the guidance of propaganda throughout the world. Some of it is concerned only with local issues, the rest often has world-wide application. The result of the talks was to persuade most of us that propaganda is not for us - there is simply too much paperwork. But despite that, the most interesting part of propaganda was obviously the business of orchestrating the treatment of events of importance among several countries. Thus problems of communist influence in one country can be made to appear of international concern in others under the rubric of "a threat to one is a threat to all." For example, the CIA station in Caracas can cable information on a secret communist plot in Venezuela to the Bogotá station which can "surface" through a local propaganda agent with attribution to an unidentified Venezuelan government official. The information can then be picked up from the Colombian press and relayed to CIA stations in Quito, Lima, La Paz, Santiago and, perhaps, Brazil. A few days later editorials begin to appear in the newspapers of these places and pressure mounts on the Venezuelan government to take repressive action against its communists.
There are obviously hosts of other uses to which propaganda, both black and grey, can be put, using books, magazines, radio, television, wall-painting, handbills, decals, religious sermons and political speeches as well as the daily press. In countries where handbills or wall-painting are important media, stations are expected to maintain clandestine printing and distribution facilities as well as teams of agents who paint slogans on walls. Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty are the best known grey-propaganda operations conducted by the CIA against the Soviet bloc.

Youth and Student Operations

Páginas 239-241:

"Quito - 13 May 1962
Because Arosemena continues to resist firing extreme leftists in his government - penetration in fact continues to grow - Noland recommended, and headquarters approved, expansion of the political operations financed through the ECACTOR project. Not only will continued and increased pressure be exerted throught the regular agents in Quito, Cuenca, Riobamba, Ambato and Tulcan, but we have made two new recruitments of important Social Christian leaders in Quito. I am in charge of both the new cases.
The first new operation is with Carlos Roggiero, a retired Army captain and one of the principal Social Christian representatives on the National Defense Front. Roggiero is chief of the Social Christian militant-action squads, including the secret bomb-squad, and I have started training him in the use of varios incendiary, crowd, dispersement and harassment devices that I requested from TSD in headquarters. Through him we will form perhaps ten squads, of five and ten men each, for disrupting meetings and small demostrations and for general street control and intimidation of the Communist Youth, URJE and similar groups.
The other new operation is with Jose María Egas,  a young lawyer and also a leading social Christian representative on the National Defense Front. Egas is a fast-rising political figure and a really spellbinding orator. Through him I will form five squads composed of four to five men each for investigative work connected with our Subversive Control Watch List - formerly known as the LYNX list. The surveillance team under Lt. Col. Paredes simply hasn't the time to do the whole job and is needed on other assignments. With the group under Ega's control we will have constant checking on residences and places of work so that if the situation continues to deteriorate and a moment of truth arrives, we will have up-to-date information for immediate arrests. If Ega's work warrants it, we may train him in headquarters and even extend the operation to physical surveillance.
In another effort to improve intelligence collection on the extreme left I have arranged to add another telephone tap through Rafael Bucheli  and Alfonso Rodriguez.  The new tap will be on the home telephone of Antonio Flores Benítez, a retired Army captain and somewhat mysterious associate of Quito PCE leader Rafael Echevarría Flores. We have several indications from PCE penetration agents Cardenas and Vargas that Flores is a key figure in what seems to be and organization being formed by Echevarría outside the PCE structure properly speaking. The chances are that Echevarría is developing a group that may be the nucleus for future guerrilla action and urban terrorism, but he hasn't yet taken any of our agents into it. I will tap Flores for a while to see if anything of interest develops - Edgar Camacho will do the transcribing as Francine Jacome has only time for transcribing the Araujo line. The LP remains in Bucheli's home under the thin over of an elctronic workshop.
Raymond Ladd,  our hustling administrative officer, has been very active in the basketball federation, teaching a course in officiating and helping to coach the local girls team. Through this work he met Modesto Ponce,  the Postmaster-General of Ecuador, who soon insisted that Ladd review to the Embassy all the mail we are already getting through the regular intercept. In order to avoid suspicion that we are already getting mail from Cuba and the Soviet Bloc, Ladd accepted Ponce's offer, and now we get the same correspondence twice. We may attempt certain new coverage through Ponce so Ladd has begun giving him money for the mail under the normal guise of payment of expenses."

Páginas 243-247:

"Quito - 15 June 1962
The International Monetary Fund has just announced another stabilization credit to Ecuador of five million dollars over the next twelve months for balance of payment relief. The announcement was optimistic and complimentary, noting that Ecuador since mid-1961 has stopped the decline in its foreign exchange reserves and obtained equilibrium in its balance of payments. The new standby, of course, is conditional on retention of last year's exchange-rate unification, that contributed to Velasco's overthrow.
Two programs are getting under way this month as part of a new U.S. country-team effort in staving off communist-inspired insurgency. One is the Civic Action program of the Ecuadorean military services and the U.S. military assitance mission - in fact under way for a couple of years but now being expanded and institutionalized. The purposee of Civic Action is to demonstrate through community development by uniformed military units that the military is on the side of the people so that tendencies of poor people to accept communist propaganda and recruitment can be reversed. It's a program to link the people, especially in rural areas, to the government through the military who contribute visibly and concretely to the people's welfare.
The Civic Action program just announced as the first of its kind in Latin America calls for contributions in money and equipment by the U.S. military-assistance mission worth 1.5 million dollars plus another 500,000 dollars from the AID mission. Projects will include road-construction, irrigation-canals, drinking-water systems and public-health facilities, first in Azuay Province to be followed by Guayaquil slums and by the Cayambe-Olmedo region north of Quito. Widespread publicity will be undertaken to propagandize these projects in other areas in order to generate interest and project proposals in these other regions.
In the station, we will work with Major Breslin, he intelligence advisor of the U.S. military mission. He will use the mission personnel who visit and work at the projects as a type of scout - keeping their eyes open and reporting indications of hostility, level of communist agit-prop activities and general program effectiveness.
The other new program is more closely related to regular station operations and is Washington's answer to the limitations of current labor programs undertaken through AID as well as through ORIT and CIA stations. The problem is related to the controversy over the ineffectiveness of ORIT but is larger - it is essentially how to accelerate expansion of labor-organizing activities in Latin America in order to deny workers to labor unions dominated by the extreme left and to reverse communist and Castroite penetration. This new program is the result of several years' study and planning and is to be channeled through the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), founded last year in Washington for training in trade-unionism.
The reason a new institution was founded was that AID labor programs are limited because of their direct dependence on the U.S. government. They serve poorly for the dirty struggles that characterize labor organizing and jurisdictional battles, ORIT programs are also limited because its affiliates are weak or non-existent in some countries, although expansion is also under way through the establishment of a new ORIT school in Mexico. Control is difficult and past performance is poor. The CIA station programs are limited by personnel problems, but more so by the limits on the amount of money that can be channeled covertly through the stations and through international organizations like ORIT and the ICFTU.
Business leaders are front men on the Board of Directors so that large sums of AID money can be channeled to AIFLD and so that the institute will appear to have the collaboration of U.S. businesses operating in Latin America. Nevertheless, legally, AIFLD is a non-profit, private corporation and financing will also be obtained from foundations, businesses and the AFL-CIO.
The AIFLD is headed by Serafino Romualdi, IO Division´s long-time agent who moved in as Executive Director and resigned as the AFL-CIO's Inter-American Representative. Among the Directors are people of the stature of George Meany, J. Peter Grace and Joseph Beirne, President of the Communications Workers of America (CWA) which is the largest Western Hemisphere affiliate of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers International (PTTI). AIFLD, in fact, is modeled on the CWA training school of Front Royal, Virginia where Latin American leaders of PTTI affiliates are being trained. Day to day control of AIFLD by IO Division, however, will be through Romualdi and William Doherty, former inter-American Representative of the PTTI and now AIFLD Social Projects Director. Prominent Latin American liberals such a Jose Figueres, former President of Costa Rica and also a long-time Agency collaborator, will serve on the Board from time to time.
The main purpose of AIFLD will be to organize anticommunist labor unions in Latin America. However, the ostensible purpose, since union organizing is rather sensitive of AID to finance, even indirectly, will be "adult education" and social projects such as workers' housing, credit unions and cooperatives. First priority is to establish in all Latin American countries training institutes which will take over and expand the courses already being given in many countries by AID. Although these training institutes will nominally and administratively be controlled by AIFLD in Washington, it is planned that as many as possible will be headed by salaried CIA agents with operational control exercised by the stations. In most cases, it is hoped, these AIFLD agents will be U.S. citizens with some background in trade-unionism although, as in the case of ORIT, foreign nationals may have to be used. The training programs of the local institutes in Latin America will prepare union organizers who, after the courses are over, will spend the next nine months doing nothing but organizing new unions with their salaries and all expenses paid by the local institute. Publicity relating to AIFLD will concentrate on the social projects and "adult education" aspects, keeping the organizing program discreetly in the background.
This month, in addition to training in Latin American countries, AIFLD is beginning a program of advanced training courses to be given in Washington. Spotting and assessment of potential agents for labor operations will be continuing functions of the Agency-controlled staff members both in the training courses in Latin America and in the Washington courses. Agents already working in labor operations can be enrolled in the courses to promote their technical capabilities and their prestige.
In Ecuador, the AIFLD representative from the U.S. who is now setting up the training institute - the first course begins in three weeks - is not an agent but was sent anyway in order to avoid delays. However, Gil Saudade arranged for Ricardo Vasquez Diaz, the Education Secretary of CEOSL, to be the Ecuadorean in charge of the local AIFLD training programs. Carlos Vallejo Baez, who is connected with the Popular Revolutionary Liberal Party, will also be on the teaching staff. Eventually Saudade will either recruit this first AIFLD representative or headquaters will arrange for a cleared agent to be sent.
These two new programs, military Civic Action and the AIFLD, are without doubt being expanded faster here than in most other Latin American countries. Recently I read the report by a special inter-departamental team of experts from Washington called the Strategic Analysis Targeting Team (SATT), which in months past secretely visited all the Latin American countries. Their purpose was to review all U.S. government programs in each country and to determine the gravity of the threat or urban terrorism and guerrilla warfare. We prepared a secret annex for the SATT Report, and among their recommendations were expansion of the Subversive Control Watch List program and updating of contingency planning in order to continue our operations from a third country - in case we lose our Embassy offices. Ecuador, in fact, shared with Bolivia and Guatemala the SATT Report's category as the most likely places for early armed insurgency. Emphasis on immediate expansion of Civic Action and labor programs is probably a result of the SATT Report

Quito - 21 July 1962